The Banana Table and the Tour: When We Do Not Learn from History

Saleh Ammar

The tripartite mechanism (consisting of representatives of the United Nations, the African Union and IGAD) distributed invitations to ten Sudanese groups to sit down next Wednesday (June 8, 2022) for a direct dialogue table to find a solution to the Sudanese crisis. to reach.
The groups to which the invitation was submitted, four of them bear the name of Freedom and Change, namely (the Central Council, the National Charter, the National Forces and the Center Stream), together with the Professional Association, the nation’s parties, the Democratic Unionist, the People’s Congress, the National Movement Alliance and the military component.
What is certain is that according to the conditions he announced for the acceptance of dialogue with the army and which were not complied with, the Forces for Freedom and Change (the Central Council) will refuse to participate in the round table, and just like its ally (the Professional Association), which led the December (2019) revolution from an early age, we will not break out of it, will take the same stance as boycotting the dialogue.While the Umma Party so far did not decide his position.
The (Freedom and Change) alliance includes (43) political forces and organizations that signed its political declaration in September 2021, most notably the Federal Assembly, the Sudanese Congress and the Ba’ath.
The other seven groups that will respond to the call for the tripartite mechanism include the Popular Congress Party, founded by the late Hassan al-Turabi, the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood and the first mastermind of the Salvation Army (1989), the Unionist, which between the years (2006-2019) and the (National Movement) coalition participated in the governments of ousted President Omar al-Bashir. Announced in December 2021, including small parties and personalities who joined the Bashir regime and held high positions, including Al-Tijani Al-Sisi, Assistant to President-elect Omar Al-Bashir for eight years, and Ahmed Bilal and Beshara Juma Arrow, who took over the Ministries of Information and Home Affairs, Assistant Bashir and others. The Group of Seven that will take part in the round table also includes Freedom and Change (the National Treaty) which was established on the eve of the coup (25 October 2021) and actively participated in the arrangement for it. It is mainly put together. of the leaders of the armed movements that signed agreements with the government in the year 2020 in the capital of South Sudan (Juba). There is also another group called (National Forces) that announced its alliance last February after the separation of its members from the Freedom and Change (Central Council) on charges of supporting the coup, and also (Central Movement), a group that has outgrown most of its members of the Sudanese Congress Party, which raises the question .The Center Movement retains its membership in Freedom and Change (Central Council) to the present day, and its representative participates in the meetings of the coalition Therefore, it is surprising that it is a separate party equal to an alliance like the (Central Council), and the same situation applies to the Umma Party, which has been one of the largest parties of Freedom and Change (the Council) since its inception, but it has been invited as a separate party!
In this way, that is, by inviting and mobilizing loyalists to the Bashir regime, dividing civic alliances and ensuring that seats for small groups are equal to larger alliances than theirs, the tripartite mechanism has placed itself in the category placed around a service to the beneficiary party, and it is the military component that considers the division of civilians as his favorite hobby and strategy as synonymous with violence!
And whoever follows the statements of the army recently and is eager to enter into dialogue – even if they were against it until recently – comes to the conviction that they have prepared the field well to serve their game plan!
What happened behind the scenes during the last period until the position of the army shifted from rejection to acceptance?
In remembrance, on the first of last April, the leader of the coup, General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, while speaking in front of his soldiers, made a direct threat to the representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Volker, reached out. Peretz, with expulsion from Sudan, accuses him of “interfering” in the affairs of the country and “exceeding the powers of his mandate”. But instead of Volcker being suspended, the military forced his British adviser, Ambassador Rosalind Marsden, who represented her country and the European Union in Sudan, to leave the country after refusing to renew her, which no need no explanation, because the reason is due to her in-depth knowledge and relations with the Sudanese, which will stand in the way of implementing plans that the parties serve on the account of some of them. In the same context, the military sponsored rallies organized by Islamic extremists against the international mission, which demonstrated against what it called “foreign interference” and reaffirmed its support for Lieutenant General Abdel-Fattah Al-Burhan.
These events serve as an explanation for the retreating positions of the International Mission (UNTAMS) in support of the civilian option, some manifestations of which can also be seen in Mr. Volcker’s last briefing before the Security Council (May 24).
The three-pronged mechanism did not invite the resistance committees and the revolutionary, youth and women’s organizations – which are leading the continuing movement against the coup – to take part in the round table. Probably the reason for this is due to the conclusion of the mechanism, and after the consultations it held with these organizations, that it would refuse to participate in the dialogue with the military. In the absence of freedom, change and the expected gathering of professionals, the result is that the street that resists the coup will not find itself represented at the negotiating table. The youth occupying the streets will now view the whole process as a dialogue between coup loyalists.
The radical views of the youth against the army are justified by the recent history stained with their blood. The leaders of the military coup were part of the Bashir regime and took part in the extermination wars in Darfur, the Nuba Mountains and others. regions of Sudan There are strong suspicions that they were involved in transgressions. Despite this, the youth accepted negotiations with them after their coup against Bashir (11). April 2019) and the image of the Army and even (Rapid Support) improved at that point, but no more than weeks passed before the military leaders returned to their favorite hobby and one of the biggest bloody massacres in the history of the capital, Khartoum, before the cameras (which the Sudanese celebrated their third year of existence on the third day), the civilian forces agreed to enter into a partnership with the army under the pretext of preventing the country from collapsing, which ended on the morning of (25 October 2021) when Prime Minister Abdullah Hamdok and the civilian leaders found themselves in custody (stormed to their bedrooms with guns) and the subsequent killings.Thousands were wounded and locked up.
All of these bitter practical experiences have played a role in reinforcing the trend that rejects partnership again under any pretext, even if the warnings of the collapse of the state are moving the international community and controlling its mind, for the same reason was the justification for signing the Constitutional Document Agreement (17 August 2019).
With my agreement and understanding of the strong and extremist positions against the coup, this should not be a reason to run the whole political process with anger, and the civic leaders should continue their efforts to put the outside on their side win, along with the struggle on the ground to restore democracy.
Here I assume that there are “professional” local parties that are causing deliberate confusion between civilians and the international community, and confronting them requires a long soul and realizing that the boycott path will harm their struggle for the goals of the December Revolution to reach and track. the way for the generals who are well aware of the importance of international and regional role in a state of fragility.Such currently experiencing. The forces of (Freedom and Change) and (Civil Society) will face an important test in this regard when the assistance of US Secretary of State Molly Faye, who has shown conciliatory positions to the military, comes across Sudan .
While acknowledging that the United States, Britain, and the European Union have giant institutions that provide them with accurate information and analysis, these countries have, however, made repeated mistakes in recent history. I recall, for example, that they insisted that the Sudanese opposition participate in the dialogue requested by Omar al-Bashir (2014), and did not back down until some time had elapsed, after which they reached the conviction that al-Bashir had “Played with his tail”. Civil society made an effort to convince these countries that al-Bashir was practicing deception, until these arguments finally succeeded in conveying his position and their acceptance by these countries.
What now needs to be repeatedly explained and evidence mobilized is that large numbers of detainees have not been released, and that military forces are breaking into residents’ homes daily, using excessive force and confiscating the right to peaceful assembly. At any table for dialogue are the active claimants to power, and these are two parties: the military component and the forces of the revolution that have led marches and continuous protests against the coup since its first hour to this day without fatigue or boredom. It is true that from time to time some tribal members and students of religious schools gather, but these crowds can not endure more than hours and leave quickly, because they have no desire or ambition to participate in an authority that requires sacrifices to achieve it and a vision to manage it (the roles are filled with stories of bribes and money paid for the success of these crowds.
Personally, I have been a proponent of the idea of ​​consultations initially unilaterally sponsored by the United Nations, and I am still convinced that Sudan is in a fragile situation and could drift to ruin if no consensus is reached, but it is not. means the acceptance of a “distorted” settlement that opens the door to a new war or totalitarianism. What we have spent many years of our lives under the dictatorship can never be allowed to happen again.
If the tripartite mechanism insists on holding the dialogue in this “distorted” way, the situation will be similar to the dialogue that Omar al-Bashir called for in 2014 (the Wathba dialogue), with a variable presence, namely the absence of al-Bashir himself, for whom Burhan and Hemedti will act after sharing power between them, including al-Bashir’s house itself in command. The situation will also not differ from the chaos of the palace sit-in (commonly referred to as the banana sit-in).
What deserves outside attention and thought is that holding the dialogue in the way planned by the tripartite mechanism “Souk Okaz loyal to the army” can be a merciful bullet to get on the “rational” camp below the civilian coup to be fired. leaders and push them to the path of radicalism that knows no solution but the army’s complete and immediate relinquishment of power and prosecutes them for the crimes they have committed, in other words: the long-term conflict that the fragile and decayed country can not for much longer than it endures.

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