Posted in: Wednesday 5 October 2022 – 20:15 | Last update: Wednesday 5 October 2022 – 20:15
Over the years, the great meanings for which Egypt fought for six full years between the wars of “attrition” and “October” have faded in public memory.
It is not possible to summarize the epic of war in some men, or accept its “metamorphosis” in some propaganda.
Under the shadow of the terrible defeat that occurred on June 5 (1967), Egyptian patriotism, with an unquestionable sense of history, realized that this was intentional in itself.
In Mashhad (9) and (10) June it refused defeat and assigned “Gamal Abdel Nasser” to continue the fight.
It was a real historical scene that was challenged, as if it were a “play” to withdraw the honor of declaring the resistance at the moment of defeat for the Egyptian citizen, whose masses took to the streets and refused to retire from “Abdul Nasser”. “.
The issue was not so much the man himself as he represented him.
Events later proved that the bet on him was right.
He rebuilt the armed forces from scratch, and Egypt possessed the most powerful army in modern history, the size of which exceeded one million soldiers, most of whom were graduates of Egyptian universities.
A modern army that takes science, its arts and strict control rules, controls it, and the credit for this goes mainly to its commander-in-chief after the defeat, Lieutenant General Mohamed Fawzy: hard training and serious rehearsals on the battlefields during the war of attrition before we go to the October War.
Egypt gave the utmost of his will to fight.
The extraordinary mandate granted to “Abdel-Nasser” was not a blank check. Student protests took place in 1968 denouncing the lenient sentences for the flagrant negligence of the Air Force commanders in the June War and demanding political participation.
The will to fight was revealed in what Lieutenant General Abdel Moneim Riyad asked of Abdel Nasser when he was instructed by the Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Army in the wake of the military defeat not to “reconcile” or restore Sinai without ‘ a fight, even though it returned completely unconditionally: “I hope, Your Honor. The president should not accept it, because if Sinai returns without a fight, the whole country will collapse morally, values in this country will fall and women will be twisted on street corners.”
Nasser’s response was: “Don’t worry, they will never bring Sinai back without a fight, or without conditions.”
Under the fire determines the main course of the new management options – the removal of the consequences of aggression and the correction of the causes that led to the military defeat.
Why, despite the military victory in “October 1973” almost half a century ago, is it intended to continue the defeat in the public conscience so far?
In World War II, the French forces were crushed.
Its capital, Paris, was occupied, and the Nazi leader “Adolf Hitler” proudly entered it to take commemorative photos at the Eiffel Tower.
After its liberation, memorial plaques were placed at the places and buildings where the martyrs of the French resistance fell.
The liberation of France did not come thanks to the forces of General “Charles de Gaulle” alone, as the military action was led by the American forces.
Egypt did not cooperate with the occupation forces, as happened in France, and its battles were not led by foreign powers.
If we wonder today about the waning public pride in the October tournaments, there are two main reasons.
The first – is due to the great event’s distance from the memory of successive generations who were not born during the war years, did not witness the suffering of the defeat and did not strive to overcome it, regardless of the magnitude of the sacrifices. of military victory.
Then it found unconvincing policies that emptied the war of its meaning and issues in the name of peace, the results and repercussions of which led to situations close to strategic defeats.
The second – that the October novel, as presented, mixes empty propaganda of any liberating meanings with a propaganda tendency that continues and insists on defeat, as if we did not fight and did not win, and as if Israel was an indomitable force and defeat was fate. discourse.
The issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the issue of Egyptian national security, which defended our forces before anything else, have been flattened.
The enormous sacrifices made on the battlefields were wasted, and a new class, initially described as “fat cats”, arose to support peace with Israel.
An entire generation who had devoted his life to the cause of his country’s liberation felt misled by the force of arms, fighting for a dream only to wake up in a nightmare.
The opening of the “Abdel-Nasser file” in the immediate aftermath of the October War was a prelude to policies that ranged from economic openness in the way it was carried out to making peace with Israel with the concessions it entailed.
It was not appropriate for a professional in the capacity of Minister of Foreign Affairs, “Ismail Fahmy” to overlook the “method” or the “method”… nor to turn a blind eye for the expected “disastrous results” of what was called the “Sadat” initiative in 1977. He quit.
Although Dr. Boutros Ghali, who rose to the top of the Egyptian Foreign Ministry in the wake of the resignations of his minister Ismail Fahmy and Foreign Minister Mohamed Riad, convinced of what Sadat had done, made himself a member found. of these he called them “Foreign Gang”, or “mechanical” – referring to the well-known English expression “mechanism” or “mechanism”, which was then commonly used among intellectuals and diplomats!
With his academic background, Dr. Ghali does not turn a blind eye, as is said in his memoirs, for the poor performance of many negotiation scenes.
In Al-Jamsi’s expression about the 101 kilometer negotiations, which preceded the Knesset visit for a relatively long time: “I was negotiating with the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger… while the outcome was prepared in advance between him and President Sadat.”
Kissinger confirmed in his memoirs what al-Jamasi said: “I am no longer a mediator between Egypt and Israel… but between Sadat and Israel on the one hand and the Egyptian delegation on the other.”
I wasted the military results of the October war with my saying: “70% of the conflict with Israel is me” and “99% of the cards are in the hands of the United States.”
The results were dire for Egypt’s regional role in engaging in unilateral peace with Israel and exiting the Arab-Israeli conflict.
“I watched Sadat’s visit to the Knesset in Kuwait… Minutes later the women disappeared. They were crying in the bathrooms and bedrooms.”
This phrase by Professor Ahmed Bahaa El-Din sums up something of the general atmosphere in the Arab world at the time of the visit to Jerusalem, which undermined the political results of the October arms tournament.